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Industrial Conflict and Industrial Relations 
in Italy: New Perspectives 
Bruno Ram irez 
The author traces the changes which hâve occurred in 
Italy's industrial relations Systems as a resuit of the great 
wave of strikes of 1969. Spécial emphasis is placed on the 
émergence of new structures of workers* représentation at 
the plant level, and on the effect thèse hâve had on the 
method of negotiation. 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
The widespread industrial unrest which has characterized the Italian 
scène for the last three years has created a new set of conditions which 
allow one to anticipate substantial changes in the industrial and labour 
relations structure of that country. 
The first major wave of industrial conflict erupted during 1968 and 
culminated in what has been called « the hot autumn » of 1969, at which 
time the negotiation of a large number of important collective agreements 
occurred. It was in anticipation of, as well as during, that cycle of nego-
tiations that new conflictual traits emerged, as evidenced by the claims put 
forth by the workers, by the level of militancy displayed at the grass roots 
level, and by the type of strategy pursued by the unions involved. 
The gênerai outlines of the new situation which grew out of that 
expérience are unmistakable, and yet a certain degree of fluidity is still 
permeating the world of labour and industry of that country, particularly 
on account of the highly politicised character of those waves of industrial 
conflict. This makes it quite difficult to anticipate with any degree of 
précision the kind of industrial relations setting which will émerge in the 
near future. Nonetheless, it is possible at this time to attempt a gênerai 
évaluation of the récent developments and try to locate a number of key 
factors which can aid one in un- I RAIEREZ,
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It should immediately be pointed out that the éruption of labour 
unrest in 1968 was part and parcel of a broader movement of social con-
testation which encompassed the entire institutional network of the country. 
The student revolt played a leading rôle in this broader social movement. 
It saw large strata of university students engaged in action aimed at 
critiquing and rejeoting the whole structure of higher éducation. To be 
sure, the Italian student movement shared the same cultural matrix which 
characterized most student movements of the 1960s, but its highly poli-
ticized character led it to coalesce with the workers movement. Soon, in 
fact, the students' critique deepened to the point of bringing into question 
Italy's entire organization of work and production which, by the end 
of the 1960s, had corne into being as a resuit of a remarkably rapid process 
of industrial growth l. 
The extremely high rate of internai and international migration of 
unskilled labour force from underdeveloped areas to industrial centers 
played a crucial rôle. The extent and the rapidity with which thèse mi-
grations occurred created grave dislocations in ail sectors of the social 
services (housing, schooling, transportation, health, etc.) and generated — 
particularly among the young génération of workers — a strong dose of 
latent discontent. In Turin — the city which experienced the highest rate 
of immigration — the more militant workers were young unskiiled immi-
grants from southern régions who found their living conditions in the city 
unbearable 2. 
A third factor was the dissatisfaction which many workers expressed 
with those political parties which were expected to bring about substantial 
social reforms primarily in the interest of the working class, but which 
instead proved both unable and unwilling to keep their 'promises'. Thèse 
factors combined and created an explosive social climate within which the 
workers became increasingly conscious of the nature of the difficultés 
they experienced daily in their work-place. 
As one focuses on the workers, viewed in the immediacy of their 
work-place, it would seem as if the workers' dissatisfaction with their 
working conditions grew as the ongoing rationalization of production 
methods reached a new plateau, under the thrust of Italy's économie 
growth. The workers could perceive with evermore précisions how mana-
gerial policies of technological innovation, as well as the continuons res-
tructurations of the organization of the work-force, were the underlying 
causes for the difficulties they experienced daily at their work-place. 
Their discontent with managerial policies went hand in hand with 
a fierce criticism against the unions and their structures of représentation. 
i MOVIMENTO STUDENTESCO, Documenti délia Rivolta Universitaria, Bari, La-
terza, 1968, 415 pp. 
2
 Diego NOVELLI, ed. Dossier Fiat, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1970, 271 pp. 
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To the militant worker the unions' channels of représentation had proved 
incapable of serving as effective instruments to meet the workers' needs. 
As a Fiat worker put it, « In that period the union felt that something was 
going to happen ; but it could not exactly perceive what the workers 
expected from the union. . . the union was a union in appearance only, 
not in substance » 3. 
This last point needs to be underlined because it allows us to under-
stand more clearly why in most cases the first cycle of workers' strife often 
erupted spontaneously, at the grass-roots level, and why thèse were led in 
the majority of cases by 'natural leaders', elected in workers' assemblies. 
Moreover, in carrying out the conflict at the plant and company level, 
the workers transcended their différent union affiliations, and de facto 
bypassed the existing formai structures of workers représentation such 
as the Commissione Interna (Internai Workers Committee) and the 
Sezione Sindacale d'Azienda (Trade Union Chapter). 
NEW WORKERS' DEMANDS 
The method of negotiation was one of the first aspects of industrial 
relations to undergo considérable change. The national contract — the 
leading form of negotiation since the post-war years — was rejected by 
most unions in favor of a new form of negotiation. Actually, the struggle 
over the form or bargaining had been in progress throughout the 1960s, 
but the unions had not been able to make much headway, although in 
some sectors they had succeeded in adopting the 'articulated bargaining' 
method — a form of negotiation which makes provision for integrating 
clauses in the national contract which deal with spécifie conditions 
existing in given plants. 
The industrial conflict of 1968/1969 produced what has been called 
« the crisis of the national contract » 4. And this was brought about pri-
marily by the pressures from the rank and file, who made it quite clear 
that they wanted to participate actively in the negotiation process by 
defining their demands, devising new modes of conflict, exercising control 
over the day-by-day bargaining developments, and by demanding a say 
in the ratification of the new terms. 
To the new militants the national contract had become the symbol 
of rigid centralization which not only promoted the bureaucratization of 
the unions, but had also proved ineffectuai in bringing about solutions to 
the spécifie problems arising out of the nature of the work-place. The 
unions, in turn, came to the realization that the 'national contract' form 
of negotiation had been instrumental in keeping them removed from the 
3
 G. BIANCHI et al, Grande Impresa e Conflitto Industriale, Roma, Coines, 1970, 
p. 180. (Ail quotations from Italian sources are my own translations, B.R.). 
4 ibid, p. 31. 
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plant confines, thus perpetuating the distance between union leadership 
and the rank and file which, in time, became one of the leading sources 
for workers' discontent. 
The form of negotiation which emerged after 1969 is one which 
reflects the extremely fluid industriàl situation in which Italy currently 
finds herself. It is based on a sharp distinction between two separate but 
coordinated levels of negotiation, — one is concerned with sets of con-
ditions which are broad and national in scope (and thus apply to a whole 
industry), the other is concerned with spécifie conditions existing in the 
individual plants. 
The fluidity factor is further increased on account of the rejection 
by the unions of the « truce clause ». This means — in G. Giugno's words 
— that « the negotiation may be reproposed at any place and on any 
issue during the three years the national contract is in effect, which means 
that there is no longer any guarantee of labour peace during that time 
span. The contract is signed to put an end to the conflict existing at the 
time of negotiation, and not necessarily to guarantee the companies from 
possible future éruptions » 5. 
The movement which brought the method of bargaining to a crisis 
point and which forced the unions to become aware of their 'distance' 
from concrète plant and shop conditions goes back to the first part of 
1968, when the workers began to voice their deep dissatisfaction with 
the existing structures for workers' représentation. What characterized 
that early phase of industriàl conflict was the fact that militant workers 
and their leaders were able to locate the sources of their discontent in 
the spécifie context of their work-place. This can be seen clearly from 
the nature of the grievances which, with few exceptions, they ail articu-
lât ed, i.e. dissatisfaction with the speed of work, the 'deskillization' of 
their job content (resulting from technological innovations), the harm-
fulness of their spécifie jobs, the hours of work, etc. 
The demand for wage raises was of course one of the central demands 
advanced by the workers, but until the unions were able to gain control 
over the éruption of conflict and channel it along a global bargaining 
strategy, the rank and file militants demanded wage raises equal for 
everyone. This claim carries with it implications which could be very 
significant for the future of Italian industriàl and labour relations. Philo-
sophically, that demand purports to be a démonstration of worker's ega-
litarianism (deemed necessary for the promotion of working class soli-
darity). Strategically, it springs out of a conscious attempt to challenge 
5 Gino GIUGNO, « L'Autunno Caldo Sindacale », // Mulino, vol. 19, No. 207, 
Jan.-Feb. 1970, p. 36. The agreement signed with Fiat in 1968 saw, in fact, the 
éruption of four major disputes during the ensuing three years. Cf. Gaetano GONGI, 
«Rapporto sulla Vertenza Fiat», La Critica Sociologica, No. 18, Summer, 1971, 
p. 70. 
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the traditional wage policies which, for the militants, are used by manage-
ment to create division amond the various catégories of workers within a 
plant, or industry6. 
Much of the conflict of that period centered over the issue of 
rhythm of work and the piece-work system. The Pirelli plants (Italy's 
largest rubber producer) were the main scène of conflict over this issue. 
There, the workers — after protracted struggle — succeeded in setting 
up workers' committees which were given the authority to control the 
hitherto unilaterally imposed production times. Similar workers' commit-
tees wree successfully estabhshed in other major mass-production com-
plexes, such as Fiat and Zanussi. As a team of labour researchers put it, 
behind the workers' demand for control over production times there is 
the détermination « to défend their physical integrity and to attempt to 
correlate the pace and volume of their output to humanly accepted 
rythms» 7. 
Directly linked to that type of issue, was the rank-and-fïle's demand 
for the réduction and the régulation of work hours. Like the demand to 
control the speed of production, the demand to regulate the hours of 
work was part of a switch in strategy, initiated and carried out by the grass 
roots, i.e. to move away from the traditional bargaining policy carried 
out at the national level, which only led to predetermined monetary com-
pensation for harmful working conditions, and aim instead at the pré-
ventive protection of the health and wellbeing of the workers. 
Another issue which again originated with the rank-and-file and saw 
unions and managements locked in a long conflict, was the issue centering 
around job qualifications and catégories. This conflict went on in a number 
of large idustrial complexes — most notably Fiat and Italcantieri — 
where workres undertook to both narrow the range of existing job qua-
lifications and prevent the introduction of new technology from affecting 
the content of their jobs ('deprofessionalization'). The tactics pursued by 
the workers in this conflict, coupled with their degree of militancy has 
led many observers to suggest that the underlying implication of this 
struggle was the workers' sharp refusai of the présent criteria of division 
and organization of work. 
It should not be surprising, then, that a stage of open conflict initiated 
and carried out by the grass roots inside the plants over issues growing 
out of concrète conditions of work and production, would lead to a 
radical questioning of trade-union structures and of their adequacy to 
6 R. GIULIANI, G. PECORA, « Ricognizione sulle Nuove Forme délia Lotta 
Operaia», La ^Critica Sociologica, no. 15, Fall, 1970, pp. 110-21. Luigi BORRONI, 
« I Delegati nell 'attuale Esperienza del Movimento Operaio », Quaderni di Azione 
Sociale, vol. 21, no. 2/3, April 1971, p. 367. 
7 G. BIANCHI et al, op. cit., p. 25. 
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insure the wellbeing of the workers. Not without reason some talked of 
a « crisis of workers' représentation » 8. 
TOWARDS NEW FORMS OF WORKERS' REPRESENTATION 
As this crisis grew, in fact, it involved even a non-union organism of 
représentation, i.e. the Commissione Interna (Internai Committee). Ever 
since its re-establishment within the Buozzi-Mazzini accord of 1943, after 
the long fascist interval, the Commissione Interna has played a key rôle 
in the development of Italian industrial relations. Owing to the particular 
weakness in which the labour organizations found themselves at the end 
of the world conflict9, the Commissione Interna took on a wide range of 
functions. They included the power to insure the existance of proper labour 
relations within the plant, the power to establish a link between labour 
unions and workers, power over the health and welfare aspects of plant 
life, power over hiring and firing policies, power over individual and 
collective grievances, and — most important — the power to insure the 
proper enforcement of collective agreements. During the post-war décades 
the continuous growth of Italian labour organizations resulted in their 
more direct involvement in the industrial relations process, at the expense 
of the Commissione Interna, whose functions hâve become somewhat 
more limited as a resuit. Despite the fact that the 1947-1953, and 1966 
accords transferred the bargaining and hiring-firing powers over to the 
unions, the Commissione Interna continued to function throughout that 
period as the key organ of workers' représentation at the plant level and 
remained closely attuned to the rank-and-file. The unions made ample 
use of the Commissione Interna in order to carry out their confrontations 
with management more effectively, and indeed, we may say with G. Ba-
glioni, that the Commissione Interna has always functioned as « the 
référence point in the unions' organizational apparatus and strategy » 10. 
But with the éruption of a movement of social protest in the late 
1960s the Commissione Interna began to appear to many as inadéquate 
to sustain the new waves of workers' militancy. Its areas of compétence 
— workers' safety and health, and handling of grievances — began to 
appear too limited. Its essential character became more and more évi-
dent — it served as an « institutionalized instrument of order within the 
enterprise » 11. Its structure began to manifest a high degree of rigidity 
vis-à-vis the mounting drives to articulate new and spécifie claims, and 
initiate new forms of conflictual strategy. As a Petrolchimica worker put 
it in the course of an interview, « a C.I. of 13 members out of 6,000 
s Ibid, p. 29. 
9
 F . MOMIGLIANO, Sindacato, Progresso Tecnico, Programmazione Economica, 
Torino, Einaudi, 1966, pp. 106 ff. 
1 0
 Guido BAGLIONI, L7stituto délia 'Commissione Interna' e la questione délia 
Rappresentanza dei Lavoratori nei Luoghi di Lavoro », Studi di Sociologia., vol. 8, 
no. 1/2, Jan.-Jun 1970, p. 176. 
H Ibid, p. 188. 
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workers did only what it could. Thèse 13 persons did not even hâve 
freedom to move within the company ; they met once a week in their 
office — on Tuesday afternoons — to diseuss their problems, but they 
could not go around the shops and see what problems existed there. As a 
resuit there was a substantial distance between the Committee and the 
rank-and-file. For years the C I . has been a label, something like a décora-
tion within the company » 12. The traditional principle of parliamentary 
représentation upon which the Commissione Interna was based became 
one of the central points in the criticism waged by the militants. They felt 
that ail that remained for them to do was to endorse a-posteriori the 
actions carried out by the initiative of the Commissione Interna repré-
sentatives. 
The process through which the Commissione Interna was brought 
to a crisis point saw one of its most dramatic developments in the rise 
of the « Comitati Unitari di Base » (CUB) — grass roots councils which 
grew out of innovative pressures exercised by the workers, at a time when 
the crisis of workers' représentation had clearly reached the lowest ebb. 
In effect the CUB s represented an immédiate answer to the workers' 
dissatisfaction with the existing structures of représentation within the 
enterprise ; they manifested the détermination of the rank-and-file to take 
into their own hands the initiative in carrying out the conflict. As the 
CUBs spread rapidly in ail major industrial plants of Italy, they became 
centers of discussion, critique, and formulation of new tactics of conflict, 
where ail the concerned workers participated directiy in choosing their 
leaders and in making décisions 13. 
The CUBs expérience was a short lived one, however, (by the end 
of 1969 most CUBs had either ceased to exist or had receded into the 
background), but they occupy an important place in the ongoing deve-
lopment of Italian labour and industrial relations, for a number of 
reasons : — 
1. The CUBs represent the first major organized expression of workers' 
action based on the principle of direct, participatory democracy within the 
plant. 
2. They were the first organs through which there occurred a merger 
between the workers' strife in the plants and the broader process of 
protest against Italy's whole institutional network. The CUBs in fact 
became centers in which students, white-collar workers ; intellectuals, and 
activists from a variety of extra-parliamentary groups converged to assist 
the workers in carrying out their conflict. The ferment of ideas generated 
by the militants and leaders of various groups within the CUBs enabled 
the workers not only to question critically the whole productive setting of 
i2 R. AGLIETA, et al, I Delegati Opérai, Roma, Coines, 1970, p. 162. 
13 G. BIANCHI, et al, 1 CUB : Comitati Unitari di Base, Roma, Coines, 1971, 
142 pp. 
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Italy's industry, but was also instrumental in shaping their consciousness 
Le. enable them to see the global implications of their concrète demands. 
3. The CUBs contributed enormously to the goal of a unified workers 
movement (a goal which presently is the most debated issue within the 
Italian labour movement) in that during their daily actions of contestation, 
the workers transcended individual union affiliations and made the 
concrète grievances common to ail the only rallying point of their actions14. 
The impact the CUBs had on the labour relations framework can 
be seen by the way in which the unions were forced to take into account 
the innovative nature of the conflict as carried out by the new militants, 
and carefully assess the philosophical and stratégie implications of their 
actions. After an initial period of hésitation — and perhaps, surprise — 
the unions were able to 'recover' and thereafter succeeded in taking over 
the conduct of the conflict and integrating the actions of the CUBs in their 
own global strategy. The unions' success in their 'intégration strategy' has 
not, however, occurred without they themselves undergoing a process of 
organizational renewal and decentralization without which they could 
not hâve regained their grip on the rank-and-file. 
ITALIAN LABOUR'S NEW PROBLEMS 
The success of the unions in taking over the conflict led to the 
establishment of new structures for workers' représentation designed to 
respond to the needs expressed by the rank-and-file. As a resuit of the 
agreements ratified at the end of 1969, workers councils, (at both the 
shop floor and plant levels) hâve corne into being at most important 
sectors of Italian industry (auto, textile, chemical and refining, rabber, 
domestic appliances, etc.). The character of thèse new représentative 
bodies is stlll ill-defined, especially on account of the diversified circums-
tances surrounding their origins. Some of them, in fact, emerged almost 
spontaneously out of the long process of negotiation ; some were deli-
berately promoted by the unions, and still others came into being as a 
resuit of rank and file pressures. 
In gênerai, it can be said of ail of them that they are essentially 
control and negotiation oriented bodies, and are composed of workers 
delegates elected by the rank-and-file in shop assemblies. Four out of five 
agreements studied by the ISRL (an inter-union research institute) display 
« a certain tendency to make the delegates not only instruments of control 
over the enforcement of agreements, but also subjects of negotiation » 15. 
The importance of thèse bodies lies in the powers which they enjoy 
in matters such as speed of work, job-categories, conditions of the work 
1 4
 P. BELLAGI, G. PELLICCIARI, « I Comitati Unitari di Base : Autogestione 
délie lotte e sociologie délia partecipazione », Studi di Sociologia, vol. 8, no. 1/2, 
Jan.-Jun 1970, pp. 197-214. 
1 5
 R. AGLIETA, et al, op. cit., p. 97. 
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environment, working hours, etc. It is widely felt that through this System 
of workers councils and assemblies at the various levels of production, 
the workers can now exercise a larger measure of self-control over their 
own conditions of work. The national agreement ratified in June, 1971 
between Fiat and the three metalworkers unions provides again for the 
establishment of a number of workers councils. A piece-work and rhythms-
of-work council ; a work-environnement council (which can avail itself 
of the help from public agencies to ensure that no harmful working 
conditions subsist ; and a job-categories council. Each of thèse councils 
is composed of six workers delegates, two from each of the three unions 
which represent the Fiat workers. Thèse councils may avail themselves 
of technical expertise which is provided by the three unions, and more-
over, they enjoy considérable freedom of movement within the plant or 
shops, which enables them to carry out their duties 16. 
Inspite of the fact that unions can bring to bear their influence in the 
process of choosing new delegates, there are indications which suggest 
that the delegate is primarily bound to the will of the rank-and-file. Indeed, 
in many cases his mandate is subject to recall, depending on the judgment 
of those workers who hâve conferred that mandate. This has been the 
case in the expérience of Alfa Romeo, Italsider, Marzotto, and Petrol-
chimica 17. 
Indeed, the figure of the worker-delegate is currently the subject of 
a most délicate debate within the Italian labour movement. Unions which 
traditionally adhered to a bargaining strategy based on the acceptance of 
an industrial-capitalist order tend to view the worker-delegate as the 
équivalent of the British shop steward' — essentiaUy a negotiating agent 
who is well inteprated into the industrial politics of the trade-union to 
which he belongs. The more militant and ideologically oriented unions, 
see in the worker-delegate an instrument through which they can préserve 
contact with the rank-and-file, the link through which innovative impulses 
coming from the base can immediately be transmitted to the union, which 
in turn will translate them into a global conflictual strategy. 
A third view has also emerged from various groups of the extra-
parliamentary left, some of which were extremely influential among the 
grass roots during the industrial conflict of 1968/1969. In their view, 
the worker-delegate should be a highly politically conscious subject, who 
could readily translate in political terms the human, économie and orga-
nizational needs expressed by the rank-and-file. As // Manifesto, the 
leading one of thèse groups, has put it, « . . . the worker-delegate's essential 
nature, namely, bearer of what springs up from the immédiate and 
collective expériences, and manager of problems which are in the reach 
of ail, make out of the structure of the worker-delegate the most favour-
16 M. P. L. NOTIZIE, vol. 2, no. 25/26, Jun. 1971, pp. 9-15. 
17 R. AGLIETA et al, op. cit., p. 95-99. 
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able ground for a political battle aimed at building up a mass organization 
which is able to express the class autonomy of the workers, their militant 
thrust, the affirmation of proletarian values » 18. In this sensé, the worker-
delegate would guard against any possible intégration of the worker into 
reformist policies coming from both management and organized labour. 
He would be the agent who insures — to paraphrase sociologist P. 
Bellasi — the existence of a dialectic of conflict between the grass roots, 
the unions, and management, thus undermining the possibility of any 
crystallization of power within the enterprise. 
It is obvious that the figure of the worker-delegate is charged with 
a high degree of ambiguity due to the fact that he functions both as the 
center around which plant-level political stratégies should revolve, and 
as negotiating agent in a formai sensé. One cannot but wonder if the 
worker-delegate can carry out such a dual rôle and sustain the tensions 
deriving from it. In many ways the long and arduous process of negotiation 
which occurred throughout the spring of 1971 when the Fiat management 
and 185,000 metalworkers engaged in the renewal of their national 
agreement, has confirmed the legitimacy of such fears. On the one hand, 
the ratification of that agreement has shown how the worker-delegate 
and the workers councils hâve become an accepted fact in Italian industrial 
relations, and how well both management and labour hâve been able 
to integrate their functions in their bargaining policies. On the other hand, 
however, such ratification was achieved only at the cost of much frus-
tration and discontent among large strata of the rank-and-file wro feel that 
thèse new structures of représentation hâve been 'used' by the union 
leadership to contain the workers' original claims, in an attempt to reach 
a quicker 'comprise' with management19. 
This sensé of betrayal among many workers leads one to suggest that 
industrial conflict on this issue will soon erupt again, especially in view of 
the new wave of négociations fortheoming in the fall of 1972. 
The search for a solution to the problem of adéquate structures for 
workers' représentation will probably go on for many months to corne. 
What appears certain at this stage of the development is that the récent 
institution of workers councils, assemblies, delegates, will make the old 
Commissione Interna obsolète, and will probably replace it entirely 
(except for the small plants, where the Commissione Interna will continue 
to play a central rôle). 
The complexity of this debate is deepened on account of the current 
political developments surrounding the Italian industrial scène. The suc-
!8 I I MANIFESTO, vol. 2, no. 3/4, Mar.-Apr. 1970, p. 49 ; Cf. also G. PANNO-
zzo's article, « Delegati e Sindacato s> // Manifesto, vol. 2, no. 6, June 1970, pp. 
57-58. 
!9 Gaetano GONGI, « Rapporto sulla vertenza Fiat » La Critica Sociologica, no. 
18, Summer 1971, pp. 68-91. 
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cessful offensive of the workers movement and its achievements at the 
labour and industrial relations level must now reckon with the extremely 
délicate political and économie situation which has arisen in the last three 
years. Italy is not only experiencing one of its most serious économie 
crises of the last two décades, but its political framework is also under-
going continuous re-alignments underscoring the difficult process of ar-
riving at the political formula necessary to launch another stage of eco-
nomis development20. 
In this framework of political-economic instability, the new industrial 
relations structures appear to be far from stable. In the attempt, presently 
underway, to re-assess at the national economic-politieal level what has 
been gained at the level of in-plant workers-management conflict, the 
attention of ail those concerned is focused on the three labour confédé-
rations and on their current attempt to achieve organic unity. Such a 
unity — unquestionably a resuit of the unifying process engendered by 
rank-and-file pressures — would appear to be the only concrète guarantee 
against a return to pre-1969 structures of industrial relations. 
Les relations industrielles et le conflit industriel en Italie 
Par cet essai, l'auteur s'efforce de définir les tendances générales du système 
des relations du travail actuel en Italie. La longue période de conflits qui a carac-
térisé la ronde de négociations de 1969 constitue le point central de la présente 
analyse. Les formes nouvelles qu'a revêtues le conflit durant la période préparatoire 
et le déroulement des négociations ont eu un effet décisif sur le processus des rela-
tions du travail. 
L'état de l'économie italienne à la fin des années 1960 ainsi que l'impuissance 
des partis politiques qu'appuyait la classe ouvrière de réaliser des réformes so-
ciales essentielles a créé un climat de mécontentement qui a favorisé le militantisme 
à la base. D'ailleurs, ces tendances se sont accrues d'autant plus que les organi-
sations syndicales n'avaient pas assez de leadership pour obtenir des changements 
qui s'imposaient dans les conditions de travail. 
Le militantisme des travailleurs du rang a engendré la contestation du syndi-
calisme tel qu'il existait dans la plupart des industries italiennes à l'époque ainsi 
que la volonté bien arrêtée des militants de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires 
en vue de s'assurer de meilleurs moyens de contrôle sur les conditions de travail. 
Cette attitude s'est naturellement reflétée sur la nature des revendications des tra-
vailleurs (augmentation de salaires à la base, contrôle des rythmes de travail, éli-
20 Cf. Michèle SALVATI, « L'Origine délia crisi in corso » Quaderni Piacentini, 
vol. 11, no. 26, March 1972, pp. 2-30, for a very detailed analysis of the récent 
difficulties of the centre-left formula and their impact on the Italian labour move-
ment. 
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mination des dangers et des nuisances, réduction de la gamme des qualifications et 
participation des ouvriers à la détermination des critères d'évaluation des em-
plois) et sur la stratégie de négociation mise au point par les militants. Sous la 
pression de la base, les structures traditionnelles de représentation au niveau de 
l'usine — comme la Commission interne et la section syndicale d'usine — se sont 
avérées nettement insuffisantes. 
La recherche de nouvelles formes de représentation a donné naissance aux 
Comitati Unitari de Base (organismes spontanés, donc informels au niveau des 
usines dans lesquelles les ouvriers se rassemblent en vue de décider les démarches 
à entreprendre au jour le jour selon les aléas du déroulement du conflit. À mesure 
que les négociations progressaient et que les questions devenaient plus complexes, 
la direction des organisations syndicales a repris l'initiative des revendications. 
Cette action a considérablement affecté le pouvoir des Comitati Unitari de 
Base mais elle a aussi forcé les organisations syndicales à réxaminer leur ancien rôle 
vis-à-vis les revendications de la base et, dans plusieurs cas, à adopter de nouvelles 
structures qui puissent leur permettre d'avoir de meilleurs contacts avec la vie 
à l'usine. 
La ratification des accords à la fin de 1969 a permis de mettre en place de 
meilleures structures de représentation ouvrière pour répondre aux réclamations 
des travailleurs du rang. Tels sont les conseils de chaîne de montage, d'atelier et 
d'équipe ainsi que les assemblées ouvrières formées des délégués des différents con-
seils. L'importance de ces organismes nouveaux réside dans les pouvoirs qu'ils 
détiennent concernant l'établissement de la cadence du travail, des conditions de 
travail et de catégories d'emplois. Ils ont aussi un rôle remarquable dans la trans-
formation du régime de négociation centralisé et national, où les réclamations fixées 
d'avance au sommet par les dirigeants syndicaux par un nouveau mode de négo-
ciation qui, non seulement permet de reformuler les problèmes pendant la durée des 
accords, mais qui tient compte de la situation concrète des différentes catégories de 
travailleurs et de la nature des entreprises, ce qui oblige les syndicats à tenir compte 
des desiderata exprimés par les comités d'usine et les associations locales de tra-
vailleurs. 
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